STATEMENT ON U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK BY DR. NOURIEL ROUBINI

July 16, 2009

STATEMENT ON U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK BY DR. NOURIEL ROUBINI

The following is a statement from Dr. Nouriel Roubini, Chairman of RGE Monitor and Professor, New York University, Stern School of Business:

“It has been widely reported today that I have stated that the recession will be over “this year” and that I have “improved” my economic outlook. Despite those reports – however – my views expressed today are no different than the views I have expressed previously. If anything my views were taken out of context.

“I have said on numerous occasions that the recession would last roughly 24 months. Therefore, we are 19 months into that recession. If as I predicted the recession is over by year end, it will have lasted 24 months with a recovery only beginning in 2010. Simply put I am not forecasting economic growth before year’s end.

“Indeed, last year I argued that this will be a long and deep and protracted U-shaped recession that would last 24 months. Meanwhile, the consensus argued that this would be a short and shallow V-shaped 8 months long recession (like those in 1990-91 and 2001). That debate is over today as we are in the 19th month of a severe recession; so the V is out of the window and we are in a deep U-shaped recession. If that recession were to be over by year end – as I have consistently predicted – it would have lasted 24 months and thus been three times longer than the previous two and five times deeper – in terms of cumulative GDP contraction – than the previous two. So, there is nothing new in my remarks today about the recession being over at the end of this year.

“I have also consistently argued – including in my remarks today – that while the consensus predicts that the US economy will go back close to potential growth by next year, I see instead a shallow, below-par and below-trend recovery where growth will average about 1% in the next couple of years when potential is probably closer to 2.75%.

“I have also consistently argued that there is a risk of a double-dip W-shaped recession toward the end of 2010, as a tough policy dilemma will emerge next year: on one side, early exit from monetary and fiscal easing would tip the economy into a new recession as the recovery is anemic and deflationary pressures are dominant. On the other side, maintaining large budget deficits and continued monetization of such deficits would eventually increase long term interest rates (because of concerns about medium term fiscal sustainability and because of an increase in expected inflation) and thus would lead to a crowding out of private demand.

“While the recession will be over by the end of the year the recovery will be weak given the debt overhang in the household sector, the financial system and the corporate sector; and now there is also a massive re-leveraging of the public sector with unsustainable fiscal deficits and public debt accumulation.

“Also, as I fleshed out in detail in recent remarks the labor markets is still very weak: I predict a peak unemployment rate of close to 11% in 2010. Such large unemployment rate will have negative effects on labor income and consumption growth; will postpone the bottoming out of the housing sector; will lead to larger defaults and losses on bank loans (residential and commercial mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, leveraged loans); will increase the size of the budget deficit (even before any additional stimulus is implemented); and will increase protectionist pressures.

“So, yes there is light at the end of the tunnel for the US and the global economy; but as I have consistently argued the recession will continue through the end of the year, and the recovery will be weak and at risk of a double dip, as the challenge of getting right the timing and size of the exit strategy for monetary and fiscal policy easing will be daunting.

Temasek should clear the air

Temasek should clear the air
It must not shrug off BoA losses as a blip if it is to emerge stronger
By Ignatius Low, Money Editor
Straits Times

What is one to make of Temasek’s decision to sell its entire stake in Bank of America (BoA)?

The move has resulted in one of the largest-ever realised losses from a single investment in Singapore’s history. The number is so large – at least US$2.3 billion (S$3.4 billion) – that one has to wonder exactly what it was that compelled Temasek to bite the bullet.

After all, outgoing CEO Ho Ching reiterated this week that the investment fund takes a long-term view, at least 10 years and up to 50 years. So it could have well waited a few years for the global economy to recover and cash out then.

Instead, it will now face the wrath of the Singapore public, already shaken by news that Temasek’s portfolio shrank 31 per cent in the wake of the financial crisis and its recent $401.5 million investment in Australia’s ABC Learning Centres has likely lost most of its value.

There are probably three reasons why Temasek chose to cash out.

The first has to do with the fact that, unlike the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), which invested in UBS and Citigroup, Temasek did not end up with what it paid for.

Temasek’s original US$5.1 billion investment was in Merrill Lynch, a truly global business engaged in high-yielding activities like corporate finance and private banking. BoA, on the other hand, is focused on more traditional businesses like consumer and corporate lending.

More importantly, Temasek owned as much as 13.7 per cent of Merrill. But after BoA’s takeover, it owned only about 3 per cent of the merged entity. In other words, Temasek went from owning a major stake in a global investment bank to a minor stake in a gigantic US lender.

If BoA did not fit into Temasek’s strategy, it was entitled to exit the investment. If Merrill had been bought by a similar type of institution, say JP Morgan or Goldman Sachs, Temasek would not have been in such a dilemma today.

Secondly, there were very real fears a few months ago that major US banks could be nationalised.

If a bank like BoA was nationalised, the value of its shares would likely plunge to zero or near-zero. That risk was enough to prompt many other shareholders to rush to exit their investments early this year, however painful the loss.

Finally, BoA is showing some signs of distress. A recent US government stress test showed that 10 US banks needed US$74.6 billion more in capital, with BoA making up almost half that amount at US$33.9 billion.

Leadership problems have also emerged. Once hailed as a hero, chief executive Kenneth Lewis was recently ousted as BoA chairman. His position as CEO is now in doubt, and the US government has urged BoA to revamp its board.

So if one is inclined to take a charitable view, Temasek’s action is similar to that of an investor cutting his losses and trying to recoup his money by betting on winners somewhere else. But such arguments are unlikely to assuage Temasek’s critics.

There is just no running away from the fact that the investment fund has lost as much as US$4.6 billion of the nation’s reserves (the topmost end of the loss range) from a single investment in just over a year.

Here, Temasek will need to clear the air on two major issues. The first is the timing of the sale.

Temasek unloaded all its shares by the end of the first quarter of this year when prices averaged US$6.73, just before an April rally that saw BoA shares double from US$7 to US$14. It is impossible to time the market perfectly, of course, but could Temasek have waited a little while more for the situation to improve?

Just three days ago, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner was quoted as saying that the US financial system has completed a big part of a painful adjustment away from its excessively leveraged state, and was ‘starting to heal’.

Tellingly, none of the other sovereign wealth funds that had ploughed into the global investment banks at roughly the same time had exited their investments.

The Singapore Government has already admitted to buying into these mega-banks too early. Did Temasek make it two wrongs by also selling too early? Could it have hedged its bets by selling only part of its stake?

The second issue is whether Temasek had taken sufficient measures to protect itself against downside risk, knowing full well that it was investing such a hefty amount in a US bank in the middle of a gathering financial storm.

The comparison with GIC is illustrative. GIC invested US$6.88 billion in Citigroup just one month after Temasek’s investment in Merrill Lynch. But GIC’s investment came with a protection clause: It could opt not to convert its investment into shares should the stock price dip, and instead receive 7 per cent in coupon interest in perpetuity.

That clause came in handy when it was asked by the US government to convert its investment into shares three months ago. To give up its right to that coupon interest income, Citigroup was forced to offer GIC and other similar investors a fairly low conversion price of US$3.25 a share – so low that other Citigroup shareholders complained.

As a result, GIC is not in Temasek’s position. It is, in fact, sitting on a small paper gain today, going by Citigroup’s closing price of US$3.55 yesterday.

To be fair, neither Temasek nor GIC – or any shrewd investor – could have predicted the ferocious market meltdown that occurred in September last year. These are, after all, extraordinary times, and so extraordinary outcomes – and losses – will be expected.

Still, Temasek should not shrug off the loss as yet another wiggle in the curve it had no control over. It must not stop doing what it does best, which is to continue to be aggressive and obtain the best possible returns for the people of Singapore.

But some serious soul-searching is in order at the 35-year-old institution so it can emerge stronger and better-equipped for the job ahead.

Thriving bear sees many more US bank failures

Thriving bear sees many more US bank failures
Reuters in New York
Apr 04, 2009

John Jacquemin, a hedge fund manager of Mooring Financial Corp, who predicted the credit crisis and tripled his investors’ money over the past two years, warned that hundreds of United States banks were doomed to fail and that an economic recovery was far away.

Mooring Financial has posted 10 consecutive years of gains snapping up loans at distressed prices, while his two-year-old Intrepid Opportunities Fund generated 222 per cent returns betting against corporate debt and financial stocks.

Beyond a housing glut and slower consumer spending, Mr Jacquemin said he remained bearish because banks and regulators had not confronted the mountains of bad loans still on banks’ books.

While banks needed to mark down bonds to prevailing market prices, “with whole loans, they don’t have to and they haven’t”, he said.

“If they did, there would be literally hundreds and hundreds of insolvent banks,” he said.

Eighteen years ago, Mr Jacquemin was a commercial lender who snapped up loans sold by Resolution Trust and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp in the wake of the savings and loans crisis.

Mr Jacquemin said government agencies were aggressive in closing failed banks, selling branches and deposits to the highest bidders. Today, he contends, officials have been more tentative, allowing weak banks to hobble along.

“If the banks sold these loans for what they could get, they would be insolvent,” Mr Jacquemin said. “The difference between now and the 1990s is the government today is not closing banks down.”

This approach would only prolong the crisis.

“They’re not being aggressive because it would scare the hell out of us,” Mr Jacquemin said. “But we can’t get rid of the problem the way they’re approaching it now … [The government] ought to be closing the weak banks and helping recapitalise the stronger ones.”

Little-known Mooring Financial has generated returns on par with renowned credit market bear John Paulson and his hedge fund firm Paulson.

Mr Jacquemin’s Mooring Capital Fund has never had a losing year and returned 12 per cent a year, on average, for 10 years buying distressed loans and debt.

The excesses of the credit bubble – reckless leverage and frothy property markets – prompted him to launch Intrepid Opportunities in February 2007.

The fund shorted indices that tracked bond and mortgage markets, as well as bet against banks, credit card lenders and other financial companies.

The new fund soared 56 per cent last year, when equities fell 40 per cent and the average hedge fund dropped 18 per cent.

Mr Jacquemin said the firm, which manages US$400 million, was seeking new investors.

While bank shares have rallied in recent weeks, Mr Jacquemin has maintained his negative views on corporate bonds and finance stocks.

He predicts rising commercial property defaults and worries that consumer spending will never rebound to pre-crisis levels.

Mr Jacquemin said housing prices would not improve until the glut of empty units was absorbed – a process that will take at least 18 months and as long as 2-1/2 years.

GIC cuts loss in one fell swop

See also
http://chenreiki.com/blog/archives/376
http://chenreiki.com/blog/archives/350
http://chenreiki.com/blog/archives/327

Mon, Mar 02, 2009
The Business Times

GIC cuts loss in one fell swop

By Conrad Tan

THE Government of Singapore Investment Corp (GIC) will convert all its preferred shares in Citigroup into common stock to cut its losses. The swop will give it an 11.1 per cent stake in the troubled US bank, which yesterday announced a sweeping plan to boost its common equity base. The conversion will pare GIC’s paper loss on its original US$6.88 billion investment in Citi from 80 per cent or US$5.5 billion to 24 per cent, or US$1.67 billion, based on Thursday’s closing price of US$2.46 for Citi shares.

Separately, Citi said yesterday that it plans to swop up to US$52.5 billion of its preferred stock, including US$25 billion of the US$45 billion held by the US government, for ordinary shares.

Citi also recorded a massive US$10 billion charge for impairment of goodwill and other intangible assets in the fourth quarter, resulting in an additional net loss of US$9 billion for the final three months of last year.

For GIC, the decision to convert its shares appears to have been the lesser of two unpalatable choices. Citi yesterday suspended dividend payments on its preferred shares as well as common stock, which means that GIC would lose the 7 per cent annual dividend that it has been receiving if it chose not to convert its holdings.

The conversion will make GIC the second-biggest shareholder in Citi with a stake of about 11 per cent, compared to about 4 per cent at the time of its original investment. The US government will be Citi’s largest shareholder, owning 36-38 per cent of Citi’s common equity. The final stakes will depend on how many investors in the publicly held tranche of Citi’s preferred stock decide to participate in the share conversion.

One thing is certain: Existing ordinary shareholders will suffer massive dilution of more than 70 per cent. Citi shares plunged 37 per cent to US$1.55 at the start of US trading yesterday after the bank’s announcement. At that price, GIC’s unrealised loss on its Citi investment would be US$3.6 billion. The profitability of US banks ‘is likely to be impaired in the next two years’, said Ng Kok Song, GIC’s group chief investment officer in a statement.

‘GIC’s view is that with this latest move, Citigroup’s capacity to weather the severe economic downturn will be strengthened.’

Before yesterday’s announcement, the market value of the preferred shares held by GIC had already slumped 80 per cent to just US$1.376 billion since its initial investment in Citi, as mounting losses made it less likely that the bank would be able to keep up its dividend payments.

The US government, GIC and other investors that bought Citi preferred stock alongside GIC in January last year will receive common stock at a price of US$3.25 a share. Those investors, including Saudi Arabia’s Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal, have agreed to the exchange, said Citi.

At the conversion price of US$3.25, GIC will get some 2.12 billion common shares in exchange for its US$6.88 billion in preferred stock. Based on Thursday’s closing price of US$2.46 a share, GIC’s stake after conversion is worth US$5.21 billion.

That puts GIC’s unrealised loss on its original US$6.88 billion investment in Citi at US$1.67 billion after the conversion, compared to US$5.5 billion before.

Under the original terms of GIC’s investment in Citi, it would have had to pay a much higher conversion price of US$26.35 for each common share, GIC said. That would have translated into a stake of just 261.1 million shares, worth a mere US$642 million at Thursday’s closing price for Citi shares.

But the conversion also means that GIC will now bear greater risk than before, as an ordinary shareholder. It also gives up for good the 7 per cent annual dividend that it previously earned on its preferred shares.

Citi chief executive Vikram Pandit said that the conversion plan had just ‘one goal’ – to increase the bank’s tangible common equity or TCE. Converting its preferred shares into ordinary equity will boost its TCE ratio – the focus of stress tests by US regulators starting this week as a key measure of the bank’s ability to withstand further losses if the recession is worse than expected.

Ordinary shareholders are the first to suffer any losses, so common equity is seen as the highest quality of capital that a bank holds, and the size of a bank’s common equity base relative to its assets is considered the purest measure of its buffer against losses.

The hope is that by raising its TCE ratio, Citi will be able to weather the worst recession that the US has seen in decades. The plan is expected to increase its TCE as a proportion of its risk-weighted assets from less than 3 per cent now to 7.9 per cent.

Crucially, it does so without the need to inject more money from the public purse. That makes it unnecessary for the US government to seek the approval of lawmakers for more funds amid growing public fury over the use of taxpayers’ money to bail out large banks.

But the US government could still inject more capital into Citi – in the form of mandatory convertible preferred shares – if the stress tests show that the bank’s capital cushion still needs bolstering. That would mean further dilution for ordinary shareholders, including GIC, when the shares are eventually converted to common stock.

‘As a shareholder, GIC supports the initiative by Citigroup and the US government to strengthen the quality of the bank’s capital base in view of the challenging economic environment,’ GIC said in a statement.

Best Credit Card in Hong Kong

I normally use Standard Chartered American Express because they have the best rewards points system. Unfortunately, they have discreetly modified their rewards scheme so they are no longer the best credit card in Hong Kong.


The best card is currently the DBS Black American Express
HK$6 = 1 air mile


followed by the Citibank PremierMiles Visa
HK$8 = 1 air mile

For the air miles rewards scheme, it is better to enrol in Krisflyer than Asiamiles because you need less points under Krisflyer to get an air ticket to Singapore. I think it is 22,500 for Krisflyer compared to 30,000 for Asiamiles.

Jim Rogers

“Be extremely skeptical, and stay with what you know. The great success stories in life are people who figure out what they know, stay with it, put their eggs in that basket and watch it very carefully. Don’t listen to me or anybody else.”

~ Jim Rogers

Ted Williams

Ted Williams was the most robust batter in baseball history. Williams discarded the strike zone and ignored umpire calls, instead creating his own personal batting zone. This was an area divided into 77 sub-sectors each the size of a baseball.

Through many trials, Williams determined that the probability distribution of him getting a hit was best in only nine of those zones. Using tremendous discipline in his set-up, he would only swing the bat if a pitch was in one of those nine zones. The results are recorded in baseball’s Hall of Fame.

If there was ever a time in market history when we all need to be Ted Williams, it’s now.

Black Swan Revisited

The Black Swan theory (in Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s version) refers to a large-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare event beyond the realm of normal expectations. The term black swan comes from the commonplace Western cultural assumption that all swans are white. In that context, a black swan was a metaphor for something that could not exist. The 17th Century discovery of black swans in Australia metamorphosed the term to connote that the perceived impossibility actually came to pass.

In risk management, we need to deal with black swans that have consequences. Further, a search in the literature in the philosophy and history of probability shows the depressing fact that large impact events are absent from discussions. Probabilities by themselves do not matter. They can be very small, but their results are not. What matters in life is the equation probability x consequence. This point may appear to be simple, but its consequences are not.

If small probability events carry large impacts, and these small probability events are more difficult to compute from past data itself, then our empirical knowledge about the potential contribution – or role – of rare events (probability x consequence) is inversely proportional to their impact.

Warren Buffett Interview

What can I possibly do with billions and billions of dollars? I don’t see the fuss in having 6 houses with greenskeepers; I don’t see the fuss in having 20 cars in the garage. If you think about it you are living better than John D. Rockefeller. If you want to watch the Super Bowl you just turn on the TV and watch it. If he wanted to see the World Series it would take him a long time to get there, and he would not have air conditioning and that type of thing. The problem is not getting rich, but finding a game you enjoy and living a normal life. The most important thing is finding the right spouse. If you make the wrong decision on that you will regret it, there is a lot of pain involved, but if you have the right spouse it is just wonderful. What qualities do you look for in a spouse? Humour, looks, character, brains, or just someone with low expectations. The most important decision that you will make is that. If you make that one decision right I will guarantee you a good result in life.

Question: What is happiness? Are you happy?

I am so blessed. I get to do what I like to do with people that I love. That is happiness. I am happy day after day after day. How could I be any happier? Someone once said success is getting what you want and happiness is wanting what you get. And that’s what I see in people as I look around. The only thing I have to do in life that I don’t like doing is fire people occasionally – very seldom. I would pay a lot of money if I didn’t have to do that. But wverything else I like. I’m doing what I like doing. I could be playing shuffleboard, I could be in Vegas, but I’m doing what I like doing. There is a woman here in Omaha who is a Polish Jew. She was in Auschwitz, her family was in Auschwitz. One would be in one line, another in another line. One of them didn’t come out. She said this to me “Warren, I am very slow to make friends, because the bottom line when I look at somebody is would they hide me?” Now I know people my age that have dozens and dozens of people who would hide them, Tom Murphy for example from Berkshire. I can tell you about a whole bunch of others who are worth billions and billions of dollars, who have schools named after them, who nobody would hide them. Their own kids wouldn’t even hide them “He is in the attic, he is in the attic”. That hiding is just a metaphor for love. If you have people that you want to love you, that do love you. If you leave out illness I have never found anyone who has dozens of people who love them, or would hide them using my metaphor, who is an unhappy person. I have seen all kinds of people that they are miserable. They have what the rest of the world may think is important, but they don’t have anybody who gives a damn about them. Being given unconditional love is the greatest benefit you can ever get. The incredible thing about love is that you can’t get rid of it. If you try to give it away you end up with twice as much, but if you try to hold onto it, it disappears. It is an extraordinary situation, where the people who just absolutely push it out, get it back tenfold. My friend Tom Murphy that I mentioned before, if he does 20 things for me he doesn’t expect even one back.

Cognitive restructuring

Cognitive restructuring in cognitive therapy is the process of learning to refute cognitive distortions, or fundamental “faulty thinking,” with the goal of replacing one’s irrational, counter-factual beliefs with more accurate and beneficial ones.

The cognitive restructuring theory holds that your own unrealistic beliefs are directly responsible for generating dysfunctional emotions and their resultant behaviors, like stress, depression, anxiety, and social withdrawal, and that we humans can be rid of such emotions and their effects by dismantling the beliefs that give them life. Because one sets unachievable goals — “Everyone must love me; I have to be thoroughly competent; I have to be the best in everything” — a fear of failure results.

Cognitive restructuring then advises to change such irrational beliefs and substitute more rational ones: “I can fail. Although it would be nice, I didn’t have to be the best in everything.” [Ellis and Harper, 1975; Ellis 1998]

This is accomplished by leading the subject to:

* Gain awareness of detrimental thought habits
* Learn to challenge them
* Substitute life-enhancing thoughts and beliefs

The rationale used in cognitive restructuring attempts to strengthen the client’s belief that 1) ‘self-talk’ can influence performance, and 2) in particular self-defeating thoughts or negative self-statements can cause emotional distress and interfere with performance, a process that then repeats again in a cycle.